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Resource access control is paramount for open-ended systems:
Correctness
If entity p gets access to resource r, then p is “authorised” to access r.
Different mechanisms provide for different meanings of “authorised.”
Identity-based for centralised systems: e.g., Access Control
Matrices – p is authorised to access r if entry (p,r) is true.
Identity-based for decentralised systems: e.g., Public Key Digital
Signatures – p is authorised to access r if p can sign with key kp.
Credential-based for decentralised systems: e.g., Traditional Trust
Management – p using public key pkp is authorised if it carries a
certiﬁcate from an appropriate authority.
V. Sassone (Sussex) Concrete Reputation Systems 05.07.07 2 / 25Access Control
Resource access control is paramount for open-ended systems:
Correctness
If entity p gets access to resource r, then p is “authorised” to access r.
Different mechanisms provide for different meanings of “authorised.”
Identity-based for centralised systems: e.g., Access Control
Matrices – p is authorised to access r if entry (p,r) is true.
Identity-based for decentralised systems: e.g., Public Key Digital
Signatures – p is authorised to access r if p can sign with key kp.
Credential-based for decentralised systems: e.g., Traditional Trust
Management – p using public key pkp is authorised if it carries a
certiﬁcate from an appropriate authority.
V. Sassone (Sussex) Concrete Reputation Systems 05.07.07 2 / 25Access Control
Resource access control is paramount for open-ended systems:
Correctness
If entity p gets access to resource r, then p is “authorised” to access r.
Different mechanisms provide for different meanings of “authorised.”
Identity-based for centralised systems: e.g., Access Control
Matrices – p is authorised to access r if entry (p,r) is true.
Identity-based for decentralised systems: e.g., Public Key Digital
Signatures – p is authorised to access r if p can sign with key kp.
Credential-based for decentralised systems: e.g., Traditional Trust
Management – p using public key pkp is authorised if it carries a
certiﬁcate from an appropriate authority.
V. Sassone (Sussex) Concrete Reputation Systems 05.07.07 2 / 25Access Control
Resource access control is paramount for open-ended systems:
Correctness
If entity p gets access to resource r, then p is “authorised” to access r.
Different mechanisms provide for different meanings of “authorised.”
Identity-based for centralised systems: e.g., Access Control
Matrices – p is authorised to access r if entry (p,r) is true.
Identity-based for decentralised systems: e.g., Public Key Digital
Signatures – p is authorised to access r if p can sign with key kp.
Credential-based for decentralised systems: e.g., Traditional Trust
Management – p using public key pkp is authorised if it carries a
certiﬁcate from an appropriate authority.
V. Sassone (Sussex) Concrete Reputation Systems 05.07.07 2 / 25Reputation Systems
and dynamic trust management...
Reputation
Behaviour-based: an entity’s (perceived) behaviour in past
interactions is used to determine its privilege in future ones.
Relevant for large decentralised systems with multiple interactions.
But, when is an entity in a reputation system “authorised”?
Existing systems provide no “correctness” criteria.
often “reputation information” undergoes heavy abstraction
– e.g., Eigentrust and Ebay.
Reputation System Security
The degree of conﬁdence (trust) in p’s actions at time t, is determined
by p’s behaviour up until time t according to a given policy ψ.
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and reputation systems
Example:
Suppose you download what claims to be a new cool browser
from some unknown site. Your trust policy may be:
allow the program to connect to a remote site if and only if it has
neither tried to open a local ﬁle that it has not created, nor to
modify a ﬁle it has created, nor to create a sub-process.
This deﬁnition of reputation system security ﬁts well with the goals of
history-based access control.
Reputation-Based Access Control
If entity p gains access to resource r at time t, then p’s behaviour up
until time t satisﬁes a given requirement ψr.
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Interactions and Protocols
At an abstract level, entities in a distributed system interact
according to protocols;
Information about an external entity is just information about a
number of (past) protocol runs with that entity.
Events as Model of Information
A protocol can be speciﬁed as a concurrent process, at different
levels of abstractions.
Event structures were invented to give formal semantics to truely
concurrent processes, expressing “causation” and “conﬂict.”
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Reputation System Security
If entity p gains access to resource r at time t, then the p’s behaviour
up until t satisﬁes requirement ψr.
Speciﬁcation problem: How to specify requirements ψr?
The language must be expressive, intuitive, declarative, ...
Veriﬁcation problem: given h and ψr does h |= ψr?
but information is provided incrementally: the model checking
must be dynamic, i.e., support the operations h.update(e,i) and
h.new().
and, of course, the “representation” of h must be such that the
question h |= ψr is efﬁcient to answer.
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Syntax
ψ ::= e | 3e | ψ0 ∧ ψ1|ψ0 ∨ ψ1 | ¬ψ | X−1ψ | ψ0 S ψ1
Semantics: forcing |= of formulas ψ by histories h = x1x2 ···xn
h |= ψ ⇐⇒ (h,|h|) |= ψ (h 6= )
(h,i) |= e iff e ∈ xi
(h,i) |= 3e iff e r # xi
(h,i) |= ψ0 ∧ ψ1 iff (h,i) |= ψ0 and (h,i) |= ψ1
(h,i) |= ψ0 ∨ ψ1 iff (h,i) |= ψ0 or (h,i) |= ψ1
(h,i) |= ¬ψ iff (h,i) 6|= ψ
(h,i) |= X−1ψ iff i > 0 and (h,i − 1) |= ψ
(h,i) |= ψ0 S ψ1 iff ∃j ≤ i.(h,j) |= ψ1 and
∀j0.j < j0 ≤ i ⇒ (h,j0) |= ψ0
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Theorem
DMC.init() O(|ψ|)
DMC.new() O(|ψ|)
DMC.update(e,i) O((K − i + 1) · |ψ|)
DMC.check() O(1)
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Consider x1x2 ···xn |= ψ? as an acceptance problem for an automata
reading symbols from CES.
Theorem
Language Lψ = {h ∈ CES
∗ | h |= ψ} is regular. Can identify an
automata to recognise the “good” histories.
Transition s
xi → s0 depends only on current state s and conﬁguration xi.
Complexity: In fact, this amounts to precompute the transitions, and
save a factor |ψ| at runtime at the price of a cost at startup time.
DMC.init() O(2|ψ| · |CES| · |ψ|)
DMC.new() O(1)
DMC.update(e,i) O(K − i + 1)
DMC.check() O(1)
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ψ ::= ···e(v) | 3e(v) | ··· | Qx : P.ψ
v is a variable or a parameter, P is a parameter set, Q is ∀ or ∃.
Histories h are now sequences of conﬁgurations from
parameterised event-structures.
A conﬁguration xi is a partial map events * parameters.
Semantics is relative to an environment σ:
(h,i) |=σ e(v) iff e ∈ dom(xi) and xi(e) = σ(v)
. . .
(h,i) |=σ ∀x : Pj.ψ iff for all p ∈ Pj.(h,i) |=((x7→p)/σ) ψ
(h,i) |=σ ∃x : Pj.ψ iff there exists p ∈ Pj.(h,i) |=((x7→p)/σ) ψ
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Given history h and quantiﬁed policy ψ, does h |= ψ?
We can generalise boolean array algorithm by:
Eliminating quantiﬁers by (careful) instantiation of variables
Binding variables to parameters via a constraints language
Constraints:
c ::= ⊥ | x = p | c ∧ c | c ∨ c | ¬c (x ∈ Var,p ∈ Par)
We map (h,k,ψ) into a constraint JψKk
h; e.g.,
Je(v)Kk
h =

 
 
x = p if v = x and hk(e) = p;
> if v = p and hk(e) = p;
⊥ if otherwise
JQx : P.ψKk
h is obtained by a conjuction/disjunction of constraints over
all possible instantiations of x: there are only ﬁnitely many!
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Maintain
history h = x1 ···xn, and
constraint arrays C1,...,Cn
Invariant
∀σ.(h,k) |=σ ψi ⇐⇒ σ |= Ck[i]
xk xk+1
c0 Jψ0Kk
h
c1 Jψ1Kk
h
. . .
ci JψiKk
h
. . .
? Jψ0Kk+1
h
? Jψ1Kk+1
h
. . .
? JψiKk+1
h
c0 Jψi+1Kk+1
h
c00 Jψi+2Kk+1
h . . .
Algorithm – case S
suppose ψi = ψi+1 S ψi+2
then we can deﬁne
Ck+1[i] = Ck+1[i + 2] ∨
(Ck[i] ∧ Ck+1[i + 1])
so we can ﬁll array Ck+1 in linear
time (in |ψ|) given Ck.
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suppose ψi = ψi+1 S ψi+2
then we can deﬁne
Ck+1[i] = Ck+1[i + 2] ∨
(Ck[i] ∧ Ck+1[i + 1])
so we can ﬁll array Ck+1 in linear
time (in |ψ|) given Ck.
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Theorem
Model checking of quantiﬁed policies is decidable.
Caveat: deciding h |= ψ for a closed ψ even in small models is
PSPACE complete.
Proof: reduction from quantiﬁed boolean logic)
Theorem
DMC.init() O(|ψ|)
DMC.new() O(|ψ| · (|Ph| + 1)n)
DMC.update(e,p,i) O((K − i + 1) · |ψ| · (|Ph| + 2)n)
DMC.check() O(1)
(n number of quantiﬁers)
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A framework for “reputation systems” and a notion of “security” for
such systems.
I applications to history-based access control.
Basic Policies can be speciﬁed declaratively and veriﬁed
efﬁciently.
Quantiﬁed policies are expressive, and quantiﬁed model checking
is decidable (though hard with many quantiﬁers).
Future Work?
I Tighten bounds on quantiﬁed algorithm
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